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A Thirsty Dragon
China’s Oil Diplomacy
Antonio Fiori
1.	 Introduction
China’s economic performance over the last three decades can only be 
characterized as impressive and unprecedented. The country has enjoyed 
double-digit annual economic growth since the launch of economic 
reforms and openings at the end of the 1970s, presently becoming the 
second largest economy in the world, having overtaken Japan in 2010. 
China’s n nominal GDP climbed from $440 billion in 1993 to approxi-
mately $8.390 trillion in 2013, accounting for roughly 30% of the increase 
in world GDP (World Bank 2012; 2013). This record growth, which has 
allowed China to become the world’s largest exporter and manufactur-
er, is commonly attributed to factors such as market-oriented reforms, 
enterprise ownership changes, and the adoption of an export-oriented 
and foreign direct investment (FDI)-led development strategy. 
It goes without saying that the above-mentioned degree of eco-
nomic growth needs to be adequately and constantly nurtured by energy 
supply. In parallel with its economic development, China’s presence in 
world energy markets has increased as rapidly as its energy needs, espe-
cially since the turn of the millennium. In 2010, China surpassed the US 
to become the world’s largest energy consumer, and in the following year 
China alone accounted for 71% of global energy consumption growth. 
China’s energy utilization has increased by more than 150% during the 
past ten years, and its share of global energy use has nearly doubled, 
rising from 11% to 21% (BP 2013). Chinese growth, outstripping that 
of all other major countries, has sharply increased its energy needs, 
and has placed the country in a central position in the global energy 
market. China’s energy consumption per capita, which has always been 
very low, has also rapidly increased, and is now high in comparison with 
74 non-OECD countries, though still only around one-third of the OECD 
average. In 2009, Chinese energy consumption per capita was just 20% 
of per capita use in the United States; however, over the past decade 
Chinese per capita use has risen sharply, by over 130% (Cohen and Siu 
2012), and energy consumption per capita has increased at a growth 
rate of 46.7%. Within 10 years, the country’s rapid urbanization will have 
turned China into a highly urbanized society, and projections from the 
UN indicate that by 2035, the Chinese urban population will total close 
to 1 billion people. This represents a potentially dramatic increase in per 
capita energy consumption, and it assumes relevance also for the future 
of the environment, as an increase in per capita energy consumption 
will be reflected by an increase of average emissions of CO2 per capita, 
worsening a general situation which is already critical. 
This chapter attempts to provide an overview of China’s external 
initiatives for satisfying its domestic thirst for oil. The analysis begins 
by discussing the tremendous importance oil has for China, in consid-
eration of its vital significance in sustaining the economic growth and 
the modernization of this gigantic nation. It then discusses the recent 
development of oil strategy in China, with a particular focus on the 
“going out” strategy. The chapter continues by discussing China’s policy 
of diversification, developed over the past two decades in an effort to 
secure a stable and adequate supply of oil, the main difficulties China 
has encountered in realizing this goal, and how it has attempted to 
overcome them. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the impact 
that energy security has had on China’s foreign policy and a projection 
of future developments. 
2. The dragon’s oil voracity
Energy is definitely the key to economic development in China. As the 
country’s economy continues to expand, China’s energy needs become 
more intense. To meet these demands, China faces a range of choices. 
There is no costless solution for energy, and all energy sources available 
create their own sets of issues. The rapid rise in China’s demand for 
energy has mainly been met by “dirty sources”, which is an undesir-
able yet unavoidable option (Wang and Li 2005). Coal, in particular, is 
still the major source of energy in China and, despite the fact that the 
PRC is the largest consumer of coal in the world, demand continues to 
increase. China’s demand for every primary form of energy is forecast-
ed to increase over the next decades, but the basic structure of the 
75country’s energy mix is not expected to change signifi cantly, unless a 
series of politi cal and technological changes were to make other fuels 
more competi ti ve. 
Though oil represents only slightly less than 18% of its total energy 
consumpti on, China is highly dependent on its oil imports, the stability 
of which it has not yet adequately secured. Oil is China’s second-largest 
energy resource, and it has become vital to the support of the industrial 
and building sectors, as well as transportati on, since the Chinese automo-
bile industry is undergoing rapid expansion. China’s automobile market, 
in fact, emerged as the largest in the world in 2009, with total vehicle 
sales reaching 13.6 million, and jumping to almost 18 million in 2013. 
Source: US Energy Informati on Administrati on (2011)
Figure 1. China’s Primary Energy Consumpti on by Fuel Type, 2011
Hydrocarbons, and oil in parti cular, are the resources on which 
China’s development depends, and the drivers of China’s dynamic growth. 
Consequently, the country’s growing oil defi cit is the issue at the heart 
of China’s energy insecurity. This dependence on foreign supplies has 
implicati ons for both China’s energy security and its foreign policy. 
Oil is the only fuel that China imports in substanti al quanti ti es, and is 
thus the resource China is most concerned about securing. Moreover, 
Chinese eff orts to reduce the country’s dependence on oil imports and 
to secure and diversify energy supplies are also increasingly infl uencing 
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76 Although China is the world’s fourth largest crude oil producer, 
and progress in drilling technology has increased domestic production, 
the country has gone from being one of the largest exporters of oil 
outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
in the late 1980s to importing half of its oil needs by 2012. Over the 
past two decades, Chinese oil consumption has quadrupled to more than 
10 million barrels per day (EIA 2014), and in 2009 China became the 
world’s second largest oil consumer, behind the US; China is expected 
to surpass the US as the world’s largest consumer of oil in 2014. The 
Chinese market alone is responsible for 40% of the global increase in 
oil demand since 2000, and the Chinese demand for oil is projected 
to continue its steady increase at an annual rate of 12% through 2020 
(Jiang 2004). 
Overall, China’s rapid economic growth and rising demand for 
petroleum, particularly in the burgeoning transportation sector, have 
resulted in a correspondingly steep increase in imports. Although using 
a greater percentage of oil for electricity production, instead of coal, 
would diminish greenhouse gas emissions, China’s leaders are reluctant 
to further increase China’s dependence on foreign oil and the corre-
sponding necessity to pay for imported energy supplies with precious 
foreign exchange. Half of China’s oil imports are from the Middle East, 
although African countries, particularly Angola, have begun contributing 
more to China’s imports in recent years. According to EIA, not only did 
China become the largest net oil importer in 2014, but it will import over 
66% of its total oil by 2020 and 72% by 2040, as demand is expected to 
grow faster than domestic crude supply (EIA 2014). There is consensus 
among experts that China’s domestic oil supply will continue to fall 
short of demand. China’s largest oil fields are mature and production 
has peaked, leading companies to focus on developing largely untapped 
reserves in the western interior provinces and offshore fields. Domestic 
oil production has been increasing and reached 4.5 million barrels per 
day in 2013, due to an acceleration both in domestic exploration and 
production. Nevertheless, these improvements will only slightly offset 
the decline of production, and imports will play an increasing role in 
meeting China’s demand for oil. China’s national oil companies will also 
face immense pressures, including the lack of a sufficient Strategic Pe-
troleum Reserve (SPR), the dramatic fluctuation of global energy prices 
and rising domestic energy prices.
To ensure that the country remains competitive in the struggle to 
secure the resources necessary to sustain its explosive rates of growth, 
77China has crisscrossed the planet, searching for new investment oppor-
tunities and competing for every promising asset which appears on the 
market. State-owned enterprises typically deal with the formal aspects 
of these acquisition agreements, but the government has also sought to 
establish strategic alliances between Chinese national energy firms and 
those of major energy-producing states in Africa, Latin America, Central 
Asia, and the Middle East. In its global hunt for resources, China has 
often viewed India as a strong competitor. The two countries have, in 
some cases, stepped up the competitive pressure by trying to outbid one 
another, but they have also pioneered some forms of cooperation. Since 
2005, Chinese and Indian energy officials have been meeting regularly 
to promote cooperation in the pursuit of overseas energy assets, and 
in the development of large infrastructure projects like oil and natural 
gas pipelines (Klare 2008).
Even though China is a latecomer to the international oil indus-
try, the Chinese come equipped not only with oil field skills but the 
willingness and financial resources to pay a premium to get into the 
market. Chinese leaders appear to have had three key priorities since 
the country became a net oil importer: first, to diversify the country’s 
sources of imported energy; second, to rely as much as possible on 
suppliers with overland, rather than maritime, connections to China; 
and third, to entrust the procurement of foreign energy supplies to 
state-controlled firms. Most analysts expect that China will continue to 
diversify import sources to reduce the risk of further global supply dis-
ruptions and uncertainty surrounding some areas of the world, notably 
the Middle East. Diversification as policy is evident in the steady expan-
sion of its sources of supply. In 1996, two-thirds of China’s imported oil 
was from just three countries: Indonesia, Oman, and Yemen. Since then, 
the country has rapidly diversified its suppliers, signing new agreements 
with producers such as Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, and Venezuela. When-
ever possible, however, China, has preferred ties with producers on its 
periphery that are capable of delivering oil by overland pipelines, such 
as Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. China has been able to realize 
this strategy by improving the integration of the country’s domestic oil 
pipeline network, as well as by establishing international oil pipeline 
connections with neighboring countries. 
In light of its national interest in oil security, Chinese national oil 
companies (NOCs) have invested in international projects to develop 
technical expertise in unconventional resources, and to capture value 
upstream. They have also formed strategic commercial partnerships 
78 with international oil companies (IOCs), and signed long-term contracts. 
The NOCs have purchased assets in the Middle East, North America, 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia. China is using its vast foreign exchange 
reserves—over $3 trillion in 2012—and the current economic crisis to 
help the country purchase equity in projects or acquire stakes in energy 
companies (EIA 2014). Chinese officials have invested billions not only 
in procuring imported oil and natural gas, but also in gaining access to 
promising foreign reserves. 
The Chinese government has also directly sought ties with exporting 
countries, and has exhibited a preference for forging alliances between 
Chinese state-controlled firms and the national oil companies of major 
supplying countries. These alliances establish political bonds between 
the two countries and allow for maximum participation by government 
officials in setting the guidelines for future deals. The signing of these 
accords, such as in the case of the Sino-Russian or Sino-Venezuelan 
agreements, is usually accompanied by numerous diplomatic activities 
and promises of cooperation on other endeavors. Chinese banks have 
worked in coordination with the Chinese oil companies and made mul-
tibillion-dollar loans to a number of countries that will be paid back 
in the form of oil and gas over a number of years. This behavior has 
engendered numerous controversies. Particularly in Africa, Chinese gov-
ernment-funded development packages, which include helping to build 
railroads, harbors, and roads and which make them partners of choice, 
have sometimes been considered as a modern form of colonization 
(Alden 2007, in particular ch. 4). China replies to this charge by saying 
that it is endowing the African continent with the basic infrastructure 
it lacks and creating markets for African commodity exports. It further 
argues that export earnings are better than foreign aid and do more 
to stimulate lasting economic growth, and that the relationship is thus 
founded upon a “win-win cooperation” strategy.
In sum, for the foreseeable future China’s growing dependence 
on imported energy will not be reduced, but probably only limited in 
the rapidity of its growth. In coming decades, China’s destiny is to rely 
more and more on the outside world to satisfy its thirst for oil, notwith-
standing its considerable efforts to control domestic demand. For this 
reason, China’s leaders are pursuing a variety of supply-side policies to 
ensure their country’s future access to oil supplies. 
793. The NOCs’ “going out” 
At the beginning of the 1990s, China was confronted by a dramati c new 
reality: its outstanding economic performance, over the course of the 
previous decade had substanti ally increased internal oil demand, and 
the immediate result was that the country had lost its cherished status 
as “self-suffi  cient” with respect to oil, and found itself incapable of 
meeti ng domesti c oil needs on the basis of domesti c producti on. Unti l 
that moment China had been considered an oil exporti ng country, but 
in 1993 it imported 9.88 million tons of oil, becoming a net oil importer. 
Figure 2. China Crude Oil Producti on and Consumpti on by Year 
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This situati on fundamentally altered China’s enti re energy outlook, 
and pushed the country to become more acti vely involved in foreign 
energy markets. In additi on, aft er having entered the group of oil-im-
porti ng nati ons, China offi  cially became a net energy importer in 1997, 
and thus began seeking a strategy designed to stabilize and secure its 
access to foreign energy resources. This conditi on fi t perfectly with the 
CPC’s guiding principle of opening China to the outside world. Already 
80 in 1982, Hu Yaobang, then CPC secretary general, had announced that 
the Secretariat of the Central Committee had unanimously concluded 
that “to achieve modernization, China must utilize two types of mar-
kets—domestic and foreign markets, and master two types of skills—
organizing domestic construction and developing foreign economic 
relations” (Kong 2010). Two years later, the Third Plenum of the 12th 
CPC Central Committee adopted the strategy enunciated by Hu as the 
main guidelines for China’s economic reforms. China’s President, Jiang 
Zemin, endorsed this position, followed by Premier Li Peng who, in an 
article titled China’s Policy on Energy Resources summed up the guide-
lines for the development of the country’s petroleum industry, making 
clear that “the development of the petroleum industry [in China] should 
place its basis at home and gear toward the world” (Li 1997), meaning 
that China should get involved in the exploration and production of oil 
and gas both in the country and overseas. China’s conviction was that 
not only was the energy market characterized by instability, but also 
that the system was created and dominated by Western powers. There-
fore, the implementation of a different strategy, according to which it 
was possible to purchase direct control of imports, or of the transport 
systems through which China imports oil, was deemed necessary. 
Therefore, to secure strategic access to oil imports, the Chinese 
government adopted the “going out” (Zouchuqu Zhanlue) strategy, 
encouraging its oil companies to share overseas oil and gas resources 
(Xu 2006). This energy strategy was embraced in line with the general 
reform policies of the time, which aimed to convert the loss-making 
state-owned enterprises into a modern enterprise system through cor-
poratization and the formation of large enterprise groups (Xu 2002). 
In 1982, China established the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) to handle offshore explorations and joint contracts with for-
eign oil companies; the following year, the state-controlled ministries of 
Petroleum, Chemical and Textiles were incorporated to form the China 
National Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC), and in 1988 the MPI 
underwent a restructuring process to form the China National Petroleum 
Company (CNPC). These three NOCs now comprised China’s petroleum 
industry. The Chinese oil companies (the NOCs) were among the first 
groups encouraged to expand into world-class corporations and to pursue 
direct, physical control over the oil produced in a given country (Lieb-
erthal and Herberg 2006). NOCs have been involved in acquiring equity 
stakes in a number of foreign oil exploration and production projects, 
building pipelines and well as setting up long-term supply contracts, 
81approaches which serve to enhance direct control over energy supply 
(Chen 2008). The “going out” policy envisions government support for 
foreign investments on the part of NOCs that secure oil resources at 
the source and/or are involved in oil exploration and production. As a 
result, China’s overseas equity oil production has dramatically increased, 
from 140.000 bbl/d in 2000 to over 1.5 million bbl/d in 2011 (EIA 2014.).
Through the implementation of the “going out” strategy, therefore, 
China has sought diversification of supply and transport routes in order 
to avoid dependence, increasing the number of major suppliers of crude 
oil and trying, through the construction and improvement of domestic 
pipelines, to deal with transportation vulnerability. In addition, China 
has also significantly increased its refining capacities, in order to meet 
its growing demand. In 2001, China’s daily refining capacity was 5.643 
thousand bbl/d, but by 2011 it had almost doubled to 10.834 thousand 
bbl/d (BP 2013). Chinese national oil companies are investing in their 
refining capacities, and this is crucial to the country’s efforts to gain 
greater control over the oil production process. The strategy, therefore, 
clearly reflects worries over the reliability of international markets and oil 
price fluctuations. Chinese leaders believe that equity oil can be useful 
in times of market disruption or during price hikes to mitigate negative 
impacts on the Chinese economy. In addition, the Chinese government 
hopes its NOCs will eventually increase the scope of their activities to 
the point where they can influence international energy markets and 
therefore give China a much greater say in international energy trade. 
Many Chinese think tanks and energy experts thus strongly recommend 
approaches that secure direct control of oil (Lewis 2007).
One of the results of the “going out” initiative was that NOCs 
established footholds in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America, strength-
ened their presence in the Middle East and thereby have exponentially 
increased the number of foreign upstream projects; often, in their 
capacity as newcomers, they have had to invest in expensive or diffi-
cult projects. However, CNPC, the largest NOC, has been successful in 
rapidly expanding its presence worldwide, covering both upstream and 
downstream activities. In most cases, the NOCs have had the ability 
to choose their foreign ventures and acquisitions, based on business 
interests. However, when faced with deals involving low commercial 
feasibility but high strategic benefit, the NOCs sometimes still go ahead 
with the deal, encouraged and supported by the government. 
82 The “going out” strategy was also supported by an effort of “summit 
diplomacy”, since the leaders understood that they had to strengthen 
relations with other oil-producing nations. China attaches utmost im-
portance to leadership summits and bilateral meetings which serve to 
signify a high level of commitment to its energy projects. In the period 
between January 2004 and January 2007, President Hu Jintao visited 
15 African countries, while the Foreign Minister visited an additional 
22 in the same period and the Premier Wen Jiabao another eight. It is 
noteworthy, for example, that upon his appointment as president, Hu 
Jintao decided to visit the Middle East and Africa first, and went to the 
US only later. 
The Middle East, home to two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves, 
was visited by President Jiang Zemin, who went to Saudi Arabia three 
times between 1999 and 2002, and Hu Jintao, who went there in 2006, 
elevating China and Saudi Arabia’s relationship to one of strategic co-
operation. Chinese leaders also visited Iran, and in 2002 Jiang sought 
a closer relationship between the two countries on the basis of energy 
security cooperation, frustrating Washington’s attempt to convince China 
to sanction Iran for its nuclear weapons program development. Africa was 
no less important than the Middle East for the Chinese leadership: Hu 
Jintao’s trips to Gabon, Egypt, and Algeria in 2004, for example, resulted 
in oil cooperation agreements, while former president Jiang Zemin’s visit 
to Libya in 2002 led to a cooperative agreement between CNPC and 
the Libya National Oil Company. Beyond these frequent visits to the 
Continent, Jiang launched the idea of creating a Forum on China-Afri-
ca Cooperation (FOCAC) in 1999 that was started as a meeting at the 
cabinet ministerial level in 2000. Since then, the FOCAC has been held 
every three years, and in 2006 it was recognized as a summit meeting. 
In 2012, 50 foreign ministers and ministers responsible for international 
economic cooperation or their representatives from China and African 
states attended the conference, and this huge participation illustrates the 
significance of the African continent to Chinese energy security. Russia is 
another important actor with which China has sought active cooperation. 
In December 2002, Jiang and Russian President Putin reestablished their 
strategic partnership at a summit meeting, and began to officially promote 
energy cooperation. The following Chinese president, Hu, has continued 
lobbying for Russian oil, visiting Putin and asking for his intervention to 
deal with Japan’s “disturbance” of the East Siberia oil pipeline project. In 
addition, Hu also visited Kazakhstan in 2004 and agreed on the building 
of the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline, and has signed several contracts 
83with Uzbekistan. In addition, the Chinese leadership has made efforts to 
open “new frontiers”, strengthening its relations with Latin America, in 
particular Brazil and Argentina, but also with Venezuela. When Chavez 
visited China at the end of 2004, China invested several million dollars 
in Venezuela’s oil fields, and in the following year both nations agreed 
upon resource cooperation. As a result, in 2009, Latin America was the 
source of 6.5% of China’s oil imports, and 5.5% of its oil and natural 
gas reserves. The current leadership has confirmed the importance of 
strengthening the friendly relations with their “oil allies”, as evidenced 
by the recent visits of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang to a 
number of states in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latina America. 
China’s energy partners are often smaller developing nations 
or diplomatically sidestepped countries that are very honored to host 
high-level visits from China and to attend pompous receptions in China, 
which support smooth negotiations. 
4.	 The	need	 for	oil	 supply	diversification
Prior to becoming the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston 
Churchill acted as the First Lord of the Admiralty for the British Navy. 
It was in that role, before World War I, that Churchill converted the 
British Navy from coal-power to oil, making the British fleet faster than 
the German Navy. In doing so, Churchill recognized that a new vulner-
ability had been created: coal was a domestic product, but oil had to 
be imported. Relying on oil meant that the British Navy would, for the 
first time, be dependent on foreign sources of fuel. It was as First Lord 
of the Admiralty, leading up to WWI, and in the context of the British 
Navy’s new dependence upon imported oil, that Churchill declared: 
“Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone” (Yergin 2006). 
What he meant was, quite clearly, a variety of oil suppliers. 
It seems that over the last two decades the Chinese have under-
stood this lesson, and have begun to take Churchill’s advice into serious 
consideration. Back in 1995, in fact, China was almost completely depen-
dent on just two regions—the Persian Gulf and the Asia Pacific—upon 
which it relied for fully 88% of its crude oil imports (Downs 2006). By 
2005, however, China had begun to diversify its mix: this was evidenced 
by the fact that that year the African continent accounted for 31% of 
China’s imports, with an additional 10% coming from the Americas 
and Russia, as all three regions became significant sources of Chinese 
84 energy supply, and vital elements of its strategy of diversification. This, 
however, did not solve the general difficulties: the first is that China 
remained reliant on the Middle East as it had traditionally been: not 
only in 2005, but also today the Middle East still is the main source of 
energetic supply for the Dragon. The other problem is given by the fact 
that, being more reliant on the Middle East and Africa, China has become 
even more dependent, as we will see, on the Strait of Malacca, through 
which 80% of China’s oil imports must pass en route to the mainland, 
and which—because of its geographic conformation—represents a sort 
of bottleneck beset by numerous hindrances, such as piracy, traffic jams, 
collisions (Lai 2009), and the concrete possibility of eventually being 
controlled or blocked by another, more powerful, actor. 
Against this backdrop, one possible solution China has actively 
sought to implement is the integration of the country’s domestic oil 
pipeline network and, above all, the establishment of international oil 
pipeline connections with neighboring countries. In 2012, the domestic 
network was constituted by 14,658 miles of total crude oil pipelines 
(67% of which are managed by CNPC, and the remaining 33% by other 
NOCs) and 11,795 miles of oil products pipelines (EIA 2014). The bulk of 
China’s oil pipeline infrastructure serves the more industrialized coastal 
markets and the northeastern region, but several long-distance pipeline 
links have been built or are under construction to deliver oil supplies 
from the northwestern region or from downstream refining centers to 
more remote markets in the central and southwestern regions (ibid.). 
Table 1. China’s Crude Oil Imports by Origin (% share) 
Source: Zhang 2011
Crude oil imports from 1990 1997 2005 2006 2008 2010
Middle East 39% 48% 46% 44% 46% 46%
Russia/Central Asia n/a n/a 11% 11% 10% 10%
Atlantic Basin n/a n/a 23% 5% 3% 3%
Asia Pacific 60.0% 26.2% 8.0% 4.0% n/a n/a
Africa 0.0% 16.7% n/a 32.0% 23.0% 22%
Others 0.0% 9.6% 12.0% 4.0% 18.0% 19%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
85The Middle East region, in general terms, is a “maximum weight” 
in energy resources: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Qatar together hold 66% of the world’s proven oil re-
serves (OPEC 2012). Due to this extreme richness, as it has already been 
highlighted, the Middle East has traditionally been essential to China’s 
pursuit of energy security, and the relations between the two are close 
and intimate. Among the reasons for this friendship is Beijing’s policy 
of non-interference, which differentiates it from Western importers. In 
2013, however, almost 52% (2.9 million bbl/d) of China’s oil imports 
came from the Middle East region, and Asian demand for Middle Eastern 
oil is constantly growing (EIA 2014). In addition, with the modification 
of the United States’ role in the region—both the reduction of its mil-
itary presence and the strong decline in its demand for Middle East 
oil—there is a concrete possibility that China will increase its influence 
in this region, as, beyond oil, Beijing also nurtures economic, military, 
and diplomatic relations with many of the countries in the region. 
The history of Sino-Saudi Arabian relations is relatively recent, 
with the two countries establishing diplomatic relations only in 1990, 
shortly before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War (Kumaraswamy 
1999). Since the mid-1990s, however, leadership exchanges regarding 
oil have become frequent: Saudi ministers overseeing the oil sector, 
or departments of finance or trade have visited China several times, 
and China’s president, Jiang Zemin, went to Saudi Arabia in 1999, and 
oversaw the signing of a memorandum on petroleum cooperation (Lai 
2007). China-Saudi Arabia relations tightened in the wake of 9/11, as a 
consequence of the tension that originated between the Saudis and the 
Americans. This situation created a substantial advantage for China and 
its explicit non-interference clause, which forbids the Dragon to become 
involved in any domestic affairs of any state with which it is negotiating. 
In the field of energy this attitude creates an incommensurable advan-
tage. Saudi Arabia not only found in China an ally with similar positions, 
but also an actor that could be of help by playing a more active role on 
the international scene. This was strongly reaffirmed with the Iraq War 
in 2003, when the Saudis were pleased that China openly objected to 
the use of force, and in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, when 
officials of the two countries worked together opposing an occupation 
of Iraq while supporting post-war reconstruction in accordance with the 
U.N. charter. In 2004, China and Saudi Arabia formally agreed to regular 
political consultations with one another (Alterman and Garver 2008). In 
those years Saudi oil exports to China increased and China-Saudi energy 
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to extract natural gas in Saudi Arabia’s al-Khali Basin. After ascending to 
the throne in 2005, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud visited China 
in 2006, his first foreign destination as king, and signed an agreement 
on economic cooperation. 
In sum, it seems that Saudi Arabia is the most attractive of the 
pathways on which China is walking in the Middle East region. It is a 
trustworthy ally that is willing to supply China with a stable amount of 
oil, which at present comprises 20% of Beijing’s crude oil imports, making 
Saudi Arabia the leading exporter of oil to China. Additionally, Chinese 
imports of Saudi Arabian oil have been increasing at a significant rate, 
to the extent that China became the world’s leading importer of Saudi 
Arabian crude in 2009. In theory, this singular increase contradicts one 
of the core elements of the “going out” strategy, which is the avoidance 
of dependence on a given supplier, but can be easily understood by 
looking at the strong diplomatic alliance fostered by a mutually perceived 
threat by the US, as well as by the pressures which Western political 
norms—elections, medial control, human rights—exert on them. 
Being the second largest producer of oil in the Middle East, Iran 
is another important partner for China in terms of energy. Relations 
between the two, formally established only in 1971, deepened after 
the events of Tiananmen Square, when China was estranged from the 
West, and found in Iran a means through which to increase its influence 
in the region. When, in 1993, China became a net importer of oil, Iran 
became one of its chief suppliers, a position it has kept to this day. 
Even though Iran’s oil production level is significantly lower than that of 
Saudi Arabia, there is a strategic convenience for China in maintaining 
intimate relations with Teheran: the various sanctions that have been 
imposed on Iran by several actors, in fact, give Beijing the opportunity 
to act almost undisturbed in the Iranian oil market. This is particularly 
attractive for advancing the Chinese “going out” strategy. CNPC, for 
example, is developing an oil field in South Azerdegan, while SINOPEC 
is investing in the Yadvaran field (Seznec 2011). Involvement in Iran is 
relevant for China to diversify its search for energy security, while for 
Iran it is important to be provided with the necessary capital to further 
develop its energy sector, which has been unable to develop after the 
imposition of sanctions. 
In 2012, however, as a result of a nearly 20% decline in its oil 
imports to China, Iran fell from its traditional position as the third larg-
est oil exporter to Beijing, to the sixth. This collapse was the result of 
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National Iranian Oil Company, regarding prices and payment periods (EIA 
2014). Even though this dispute was settled by mid-2012, China reduced 
its oil imports from Iran so as not to harm its relations with both Europe 
and the US in the face of global sanctions imposed on Iranian crude oil 
sales over disagreements regarding Iran’s nuclear program. 
China has also maintained good relations with other actors in the 
region, such as Yemen and Oman, both important oil suppliers to Beijing. 
China’s reliance on the Middle East is, of course, not without 
difficulties: since the region has become its chief oil supplier, Beijing 
has always been concerned about the potential political instability of 
the region, especially after 9/11. Therefore, China has decided to turn 
its attention to the African continent, reinforcing its relations with some 
countries, especially Angola, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea, thus very recently becoming the conti-
nent’s largest trading partner. Apart from the long engagement process 
between Beijing and the African continent, based on shared colonial 
experiences, and the intense focus China has placed on that continent 
in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen events, in order to distance itself 
from the main actors in the international community that had applied 
sanctions, Africa is relevant to China because its oil industry is open 
to foreign investment. In Africa, China has been actively supporting 
its energy suppliers with debt relief, aid, and investment for several 
years. A good example of aid and energy connection is China’s activity 
in Angola, where it secured a major oil deal in 2004 with a $2 billion 
loan and aid package, including funds for Chinese companies to build 
infrastructure, hospitals, schools, and offices, lay a fiber optic network 
and train Angola’s telecommunication workers (Hanson 2008). Based 
on these loans, usually provided by the China Exim Bank, Chinese com-
panies are contracted to undertake required projects and are directly 
paid by the bank, which writes down the contract amount against oil 
sales made to the Chinese government. Significantly, the loans are 
provided on terms that are generous in comparison to oil-backed fi-
nancing provided by European and American banks. The China Exim 
Bank loan is tied to the agreement that the Angolan funds allocated 
for the construction and civil engineering contracts tabled for Angola’s 
reconstruction will be primarily (70%) awarded to Chinese enterprises 
approved by the Chinese Government (Corkin 2011). It is evident that 
this process, which is becoming the standard for Chinese investment in 
Africa, is particularly advantageous for the Dragon. In addition, China’s 
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with respect to many African states, especially those that—due to their 
lack of democracy and human rights violation—have been historically 
shunned by the European Union and the US. China’s ties are thus totally 
free of any ideological or security obstacles, as well as of any links to 
past hostilities between the West and these countries (Lai 2007). Finally, 
Africa is also appealing for China because the continent’s crude is of a 
high quality and low in sulphur, which is especially important for China 
as it lacks adequate refinery capacities for the heavier crude coming 
from the Middle East (Shin 2007). 
Chinese influence in Africa has also been augmented by a gen-
erous policy of debt-forgiveness. After the launch of FOCAC in 2000, 
China announced a policy of debt-forgiveness for all heavily-indebted, 
poor countries on the continent with which it maintained diplomatic 
relations, and proceeded to cancel the outstanding debt which these 
countries owed China on interest-free loans maturing by the end of 
2005. This cancellation involved 310 debt packages from 35 countries. 
In recent years, China has also stepped up its oil cooperation 
with Latin America. Between 2000 and 2010, China-Latin America trade 
expanded by over 1,500%, and between 2008 and 2010 alone China’s 
investment in the region expanded by more than 180% (Ferchen 2012). 
China’s partner countries in this region include Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Cuba, Costa Rica, Peru, Argentina and Columbia, with the first 
three of those countries involved in nearly 80% of the Chinese oil-linked 
projects. Just as in Africa, according to the principle of non-interference, 
China pays no attention to the political “color” of the administration 
that rules a certain country. Beyond a large number of loan-for-oil 
deals with Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador, in 2010, thirteen large new 
deals were made by Chinese oil companies in Latin America, including 
the mergers and acquisitions of the regional assets of international oil 
companies such as Repsol, Pan American Energy, and Occidental Petro-
leum (Sun 2012). Given the new offshore discoveries in Brazil and the 
huge proven reserves in Venezuela, it seems likely that China can rely 
on Latin America to further diversify its supplies. 
Venezuela is probably the most significant Latin American actor 
for China. Energy cooperation between these two countries started in 
1985, with the ratification of a protocol on scientific and technological 
cooperation in oil surveys and exploration. After this period of explora-
tion of forms of collaboration, the two governments signed an agree-
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deepened, reaching a peak during recent times, when China extended 
big loans to Venezuela, agreeing to provide more than $32 billion to 
President Chavez’s government. Venezuela has agreed to pay its debt in 
increasing amounts of oil, over the next decade. The relationship, which 
was probably driven by Chavez’s eagerness to form non-US alliances, 
was also advantageous for Chinese companies, since Venezuela has 
been exporting about 460,000 bbl/d to China, i.e., about 20% of its oil 
exports, an amount that is expected to increase. 
In Argentina, Chinese companies have even replaced US and British 
corporations in controlling lucrative natural gas and oil resources. In 
2010, the state-owned Chinese oil company CNOOC entered into a 
50-50 joint venture with Bridas Energy Holdings Ltd., a family-owned 
Argentinian company. The joint venture then bought out the British 
company BP’s shares in Argentina-based Pan American Energy, giving 
it 18% of Argentina‘s oil and natural gas production. In the following 
year, the venture also purchased US-based Exxon Mobil Corporation’s 
interest in Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, including a refinery and 
more than 700 service stations. China also controls 50% of Argentina’s 
largest oil field, Cerro Dragon, and will control all the oil and gas re-
serves in the far southern Argentine province of Santa Cruz over the 
next 40 years, deals that became anti-government campaign issues in 
provincial elections.
China’s commercial ties with Brazil continue to grow. About 14% 
of the South American country’s oil production went to China in 2009, 
and that portion is expected to expand because Brazilian oil company 
Petrobras signed, in the same year, a 10-year deal with Chinese-owned 
Unipec Asia to export 150,000 barrels of oil a day in the first year. The 
deal calls for exports of 200,000 barrels a day for the next nine years. 
At the same time, Petrobras secured a $10 billion, 10-year loan from 
the China Development Bank.
The diversification of suppliers aims to reduce China’s dependence 
on the Middle East and on international maritime routes, concentrating 
on regions such as Russia, Central Asia and Myanmar instead. Expand-
ing transport routes is thus a central element of the diversification of 
energy suppliers. The diversification of its oil and gas suppliers is closely 
connected with the diversification of energy transport routes and an 
increase of their security, which together comprise the central goals of 
China’s approach to enhancing energy security. The rest of the policy 
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NOCs and promoting equity investments, as well as energy diplomacy) 
aim to serve these goals. 
China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca and other sea lines 
of communication (SLOCs) is the key cause of anxiety for the Chinese 
government, and therefore strenuous efforts have been made to devise 
and execute policies to reduce dependence. These include diverting 
transport routes away from the SLOCs, and emphasizing pipelines and 
other land-based options as well as policies for alleviating the existing 
threats to strategic transport routes. Pipelines are preferred to maritime 
routes because they are thought to be both cheaper and more secure. 
Beyond the recently inaugurated pipeline that connects Myanmar to the 
Chinese province of Yunnan—which will be discussed in the following 
section—two important pipelines are the one extending from Alashankou 
to Dushanzi, and the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline with 
a spur to Daqing in China. 
Central Asia, and Kazakhstan in particular, is an important new source of 
oil supply for Beijing. Energy cooperation between China and Kazakhstan 
was officially begun in 1997, when Vice Premier Li Lanqing signed an 
agreement on energy cooperation (Lai 2007). The most important out-
come in this relation was represented by the oil pipeline that connects 
Alashankou, on the western borders of the Xinjiang region, and Atyrau, 
the northern harbour of the Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan. The pipeline, 
completed through a triple-step construction (the first one from Aktobe 
to Atyrau completed in 2003; the second from Atasu to Alashankou in 
2005; and the third line from Kenkiyak to Kumkol in 2009) has an overall 
length of more than 2,228 kilometers, and it was realized through the 
common effort of CNPC and the Kazakh oil company KazMunayGas. 
Through this pipeline, China is provided with 200,000 bbd per day, but 
expansions are underway on the Atasu-Alashankou section to nearly 
double the capacity in 2014. In Alashankou, the pipeline is connected 
with the Alashankou-Dushanzhi crude oil pipeline—constructed by the 
CNPC and operational since December 2005—which has a capacity of 
10 million tons of oil per year and mainly supplies the Dushanzhi refin-
ery. In February 2011, the Chinese President Hu Jintao and his Kazakh 
counterpart, Nazarbayev, had a summit and discussed the construction 
of a second China-Kazakhstan pipeline. China promised its support with 
a $1 billion loan to Kazakhstan to construct a petroleum refinement 
facility at the shore of the Caspian Sea. 
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booming energy markets, not limited to China, but also including those 
of India, Japan, and South Korea (Jakobson et al. 2011), even though 
most of Russia’s oil continues to be delivered to Europe. Since 1999, 
China and Russia have been edging toward a strategic partnership, 
holding annual bilateral energy cooperation talks as part of regular 
Sino-Russian meetings (Lai 2007), and Russia has become one of the 
principal oil suppliers to China. Before 2011, China’s crude oil imports 
from Russia were transported by rail, but this represented a real problem 
for Beijing, because Siberia’s harsh weather conditions caused delivery 
disruptions, and capacity depended on a limited number of Russian 
tanker wagons. To overcome these difficulties—and, at the same time, 
to benefit from geographic proximity and lower operating costs, and 
to stabilize supply—China deemed the building of a pipeline of vital 
importance. The decision over where to build the pipeline, however, 
encountered some difficulties: China sought an exclusive pipeline to 
northeast China, while Japan lobbied for a route to Russia’s Pacific coast 
(Taishet-Nakhodka). It was not easy for Moscow to make a decision on 
this issue: the line with China was undoubtedly cheaper and lead to a 
more prosperous and promising market, but an exclusive China pipeline 
bore the risk of giving China strong leverage in price negotiations; on 
the other hand, the Pacific line would have given Russia the possibility 
of connecting to a multitude of Asian markets, but with the risk of 
alienating China. Ultimately and conveniently, Moscow decided to build 
the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline with a spur to Daqing 
in China, despite concerns over insufficient supply. The first stage of 
the ESPO included the construction of a 600,000 bbl/d pipeline from 
Taishet to Skovorodino.
In early 2006, following a series of meetings between Russian 
President Putin and the Chinese leadership, it was decided that the spur 
to the ESPO towards China had to be built, even though the construc-
tion began as late as in February 2009, after a “loan-for-oil” agreement 
had been reached in which the China Development Bank granted $25 
billion in soft loans to the largely state-owned Russian oil company 
Rosneft and the Russian pipeline monopoly Transneft. In exchange for 
the Chinese loans, Russia pledged to sell China 15 million tons of oil 
annually over a period of 20 years, starting in 2011 (Jakobson et al. 
2011). The Chinese section of the pipeline spur, realized by the CNPC, 
was put into operation in January 2011, and most of the oil is refined in 
the Liaoyang refinery near Daqing. The second stage of the ESPO came 
92 online at the end of 2012 and delivers oil to the Russian Pacific port of 
Kozmino, near Nakhodka, from where the Russians have the option to 
deliver more crude oil to China by sea. Russia’s intention is to further 
expand ESPO’s transmission capacity to Skovorodino by 2018, so as to 
augment the supplies to China. In the meantime, Rosneft has agreed 
to send 140,000 bbl/d of Western Siberian oil to China through the 
expanded pipeline from Kazakhstan to western China, starting in 2014, 
until the ESPO spur to China will be brought to full capacity (EIA 2014). 
The two pipelines analyzed here—and the one from Myanmar—are 
directly connected to China without passing through any other nation. 
In addition, China is planning to construct a 4,000 kilometer pipeline 
connecting Kashgar in the Xinjiang region to Gwadar Port in Pakistan, 
and a 2,560 kilometers pipeline connecting Iran and China through the 
Indian Ocean. The practical effects of this new infrastructure are thus 
pivotal for the diversification of China’s crude oil import routes because 
they avoid the jammed traffic of the Strait of Malacca. However, Western 
analysts tend to believe that pipeline projects close to the Arabian Sea 
do not minimize Beijing’s vulnerabilities in the Strait of Hormuz, between 
Iran and the United Arab Emirates, through which two-fifths of China 
crude oil imports pass every year (Lai 2010). Other alternatives could be 
a high-capacity railway across Southeast Asia, linking China to Singapore, 
or a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, linking Thailand’s north and south 
borders, that would allow tankers carrying crude oil from Africa and the 
Middle East to bypass the Strait of Malacca (Cáceres and Ear 2012). 
5.	 Energy	 security:	 the	“Malacca	Dilemma”	and	 its	alternatives
China’s growing reliance on seaborne oil imports has raised serious con-
cerns regarding the security of the SLOCs through which its oil shipments 
flow. There is particular concern about China’s imports coming from 
Africa or the Middle East, given the strong reliance on these regions in 
terms of energy supply. These shipments, in fact, are obliged to transit 
through the Strait of Malacca, between Malaysia and Indonesia, which 
surely is the most important sea lane for the Chinese, and in general 
terms one of the most important trade routes in the world. This tiny 
corridor, 800 kilometers long, 134.5 nautical miles wide at the northern 
end and 35 at the southern end, is essential to exporting goods from 
major Asian economies, including China, India, South Korea, and Japan, 
around the world. It is the primary route for energy resources from the 
Middle East and Africa to Asia. According to the EIA, approximately one-
93third of the world’s crude oil trade and over half of the world’s liquid 
natural gas trade travels through the South China Sea (EIA 2013). This 
translates into 14 million barrels of crude oil per day, 90% of which 
passes through the Strait of Malacca. More than 50,000 vessels pass 
through the Strait of Malacca every year, and a relevant percentage is 
represented by Chinese oil tankers: around 80% of China’s imported oil 
transits through the Strait of Malacca (Buszynski 2012). In 2004, President 
Hu Jintao had already commented on the problem, mentioning that the 
absence of stability in the routes of energy transport posed a serious 
threat to China. He referred to this issue as the “Malacca dilemma”, 
and announced that he was concerned that “certain powers have all 
along encroached on and tried to control the navigation through the 
Strait” (Lanteigne 2008, p. 144). It is imaginable that he was referring 
to the United States. With India modernizing its military facilities on the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the northern end of the strait, China 
feels sandwiched in and strategically vulnerable. As a result, Beijing is 
increasingly concerned with ensuring the security of the Strait and its 
imports that pass through it. 
One of the most prominent strategic responses to the “Malacca 
Dilemma” is the so-called “String of Pearls” strategy. This strategy is 
based on the modernization of China’s navy and transport fleet, culti-
vating strategic diplomatic ties with countries bordering the SLOCs and 
building ports as well as airstrips and surveillance bases. Thus, in the 
area extending from the Middle East to the South China Sea, incorporat-
ing Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia, 
Beijing has been involved in many projects that have been supported by 
active diplomacy. The region is, on the whole, extremely important for 
China, as in addition to possible alternatives to maritime routes, many 
Southeast Asian countries are rich in energy reserves. 
Several projects are linked to the “String of Pearls” strategy. The 
first is the creation of a container port and navy base in Gwadar, a 
former fishing village in Pakistan, which is now growing into a world-
class port. Work on this project started in 2002 and was completed in 
2008, with its significance to China clearly illustrated by Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s presence at the ceremony for the conclusion of the first phase 
of the project. Its importance is also clear from China’s financial com-
mitment to the project, since the implementation of the port project 
and of a coastal highway to connect Gwadar with Karachi cost more 
than $1 billion. The Chinese advantage, however, rests in the possibility 
of transporting its oil from the Middle East or from Africa to Xinjiang, 
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95through a coastal highway linking Gwadar to China by the Karakoroum 
Highway, and thus bypassing the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the 
Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea. In addition, the port is very 
convenient in terms of strategic positioning, as it is located near the 
mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a great number of oil 
resources travel, including to destinations such as Japan and South 
Korea, that China could use as a lever if its own vessels were blocked 
elsewhere. Moreover, the port provides China with a better strategic 
position in the Indian Ocean, thereby strengthening its influence in South 
Asia. Additionally, the port will be furnished with a modern air defence 
unit, a garrison, and a first-rate international airport. Pakistan promised 
China “sovereign guarantees” in its use of the port facilities in return 
for Chinese financial and technical assistance for the port project, thus 
guaranteeing the Chinese priority access (Niazi 2005). 
A second important alternative route to the Strait of Malacca is 
the long awaited project connecting the port of Kyaukpyu, on Myanmar’s 
west coast, to Yunnan province, on China’s southwest border, through a 
pipeline that went into full operation in May 2013. The two countries 
had started talks on energy cooperation projects at the beginning of the 
century, but they had chiefly focused on natural gas supply; in November 
2008, however, Beijing and Naypyidaw agreed on the construction of a 
$1.5 billion oil pipeline, and the agreement was signed in June 2009. The 
oil pipeline, 771 kilometers long and running parallel to a natural gas 
pipeline, has a capacity of 12 million tons of crude oil per year, which 
will eventually be expanded to 22 million tons (Watkins 2010). The proj-
ect, jointly implemented by CNPC and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise 
(MOGE), has sparked vigorous protests from the Myanmar population 
over environmental and safety concerns and inadequate compensation 
for local residents. In any case, the pipeline has the capacity to reduce 
China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait by one third, while reducing 
the distance that oil has to travel by 1,200 kilometers. As a result, the 
Chinese vessels arriving from Africa and the Middle East are now able 
to unload their cargo in Myanmar, bypassing the Strait of Malacca as 
well as cutting about a week’s worth of travel time and fuel costs. 
A third outpost for China in the Indian Ocean is in Sri Lanka, with 
whom China signed an infrastructure development project for a harbor 
facility in Hambantota, bunkering facilities, and a tank farm, which will 
be completed over 15 years at an estimated cost of $1 billion. The port 
will be able to provide facilities for merchant ships, container vessels, 
oil and gas tankers, and military vessels, including nuclear submarines. 
96 In addition to providing China a strategic port in Sri Lanka, Hambantota 
possesses other geopolitical advantages, including the capacity to monitor 
Indian naval activity, both civilian and military; set up space monitor-
ing systems critical for its ballistic missiles program (able to challenge 
US aircraft carriers and other forces); and provide China’s intelligence 
gathering fleet a port in a strategically important location.
Lastly, another prominent and ambitious, however yet unrealized, 
plan under the general “String of Pearls” strategy is the idea of biulding 
a canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus, a flat terrain with a minimum 
width of 50 kilometers. The canal would allow up to 90% of the ves-
sels from the Malacca Strait to be redirected and would cut fuel usage 
in half. The project, however, has not seen much progress since 2006 
when negotiations came to a halt because of the Muslim insurgency 
in Thailand’s southern provinces. In addition, the canal is an issue of 
domestic political debate in Thailand and prone to change along with 
Thailand’s volatile domestic politics.
Although the Chinese government is actively involved in the mod-
ernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in addition to 
the diplomatic efforts, the idea that the modernization and expansion 
of China’s Navy can protect its maritime interests against a US-backed 
campaign, or can enable China to overtake the US Navy’s position as 
the protector of sea lanes is doubtful. Even though Chinese strategists 
entertain such thoughts, there are a considerable number of academics 
that seem certain that US dominance of maritime routes (especially 
with the help of its allies) will not be challenged any time soon. The 
Chinese are largely improving their naval capabilities—investing enor-
mous amounts of money—but this process will take a considerable 
amount of time. In addition, a possible American-led blockade is clearly 
a remote possibility, for given the growing interdependence of the two 
economies the disruption of the Chinese economy would have imme-
diate and severe repercussions on the American economy. By contrast, 
a more modest naval force would be more useful from the standpoint 
of China’s energy security, not for competing with the Americans, but 
to support international efforts to combat piracy and terrorism around 
major shipping lanes (Kennedy 2011). Thus, despite its efforts in de-
veloping a strong navy, China has perhaps placed greater emphasis on 
creating new transport routes and diversifying sources through the help 
of its NOCs, as well as on using oil diplomacy to strengthen relations 
with suppliers. 
97Finally, for Beijing, the “Malacca Dilemma” has even more dramatic 
contours since the country does not have a significant SPR, which they 
are trying to build in order to bolster energy security. An official plan 
to address this problem was launched by the government with the 10th 
Five Year Plan (2001-2005), and it has been intended to have proceeded 
in three phases. The first phase was completed, and the construction 
of four stockpile bases (Zhoushan and Zhenhai in Zhejiang province, 
Dalian in Liaoning province, and Huangdao in Shandong province)—
with a storage capacity of 102 million barrels—should give China oil 
reserves equivalent to slightly less than a month’s supply. The second 
phase, which involves eight more bases currently under construction, 
should expand China’s holdings by another 170 barrels, while the third 
phase, to be completed by 2020, should bring the storage capacity to 
500 million barrels, enough to meet China’s demand for approximately 
90 days (Daiss 2012). Some other 168 million barrels could be added 
through the commercial reserves of China’s oil companies, but this figure 
remains unverified (Zhou and Shen 2011). By way of comparison, the US 
SPR is composed of approximately 700 million barrels, for a supply of 
90 days. China’s investment in its SPR system has the potential to make 
a significant contribution to the country’s energy security, providing the 
country with multiple choices in case of sudden disruption of its energy 
supply. However, China needs to pursue additional initiatives, and it has, 
as a matter of fact, determined to do so. 
Beyond improving the SPR, as has already been evidenced, China 
has decided to increase its use of pipelines and imports from different 
actors—Russia, Central Asia, Latin America—that have in common the 
avoidance of the Strait of Malacca. The most significant result for China 
is that the use of pipelines would decrease its dependency on sea lanes 
and increase its control over the security of its imports. 
6. Conclusions
Oil is indisputably a strategic resource for any modern country, since it 
“fuels” the economy as well as military growth and development. China 
has perceived that increasing dependence on imported energy makes 
it vulnerable to the volatility of market forces, as well as manipulation 
by other states or developments within other states and regions. This 
perception has meant that energy security has a great impact on Chinese 
foreign policy, effectively widening China’s foreign policy priorities as well 
as threat perceptions. Owing to China’s continuing economic growth and 
98 aspiration for military development and modernization, it is clear that 
energy dependence is going to be a long-term issue in China’s domestic 
and foreign policy-making. The question is how will China respond as 
its interests and threat perceptions expand and take on global scope? 
China’s choice of a strategic approach to energy supply security as 
opposed to a more liberal market approach has given its foreign policy 
a whole new dimension. The diversification policy underlying this ap-
proach, supported by energy investments and active energy diplomacy, 
has expanded China’s foreign policy both geographically and in terms of 
threat perceptions and interests that China has to consider.
China’s move to diversify suppliers geographically has meant that 
in a short period of time, China has gained a foothold in energy-rich 
countries in Latin America and Africa, while strengthening its presence 
in Central Asia and the Middle East. This change signifies a successful 
policy to increase China’s influence over the globe in order to secure its 
vital interests. It is important to note that instead of cooperating over 
energy security and trusting markets, China is using its growing capa-
bilities to secure its presence from the beginning of the oil extraction 
process to the end and uses bilateral deals with energy-rich countries 
or newly created international organizations. Chinese foreign policy 
therefore foresees an active energy diplomacy, which includes finan-
cial, economic, and political measures. The aim of such policies is the 
creation of close partnerships between China and energy-rich countries 
and regions, in order to secure better access to their energy resources 
as well as to reduce chances of political manipulation.
Due to the high consumption levels of both the US and China, 
China’s energy partnerships have increasingly lead to a weakening of 
the role of the US in these regions, and at other times have simply 
strengthened China’s strategic influence, and are thereby contributing 
to bilateral competition. The US has therefore been understandably 
anxious when observing this spread of Chinese influence in regions that 
are central to US energy security as well as for maintaining its general 
global influence and authority.
China’s energy security foreign policy has great potential to under-
mine the US agenda and influence in energy-rich countries and regions 
while spreading unease about pro-Chinese political realignments. One 
such example is Central Asia, where China’s active energy diplomacy has 
significantly weakened the US presence and has undermined its energy, 
security, and democratization concerns.
99Although China and the US in fact share a number of interests in 
the region as both countries gain from the existing security and stability, 
the common concerns have not facilitated cooperation: this is because 
next to common concerns stand diverging interests, an important one 
of which is democratization. The US sees democracy and a strong civil 
society as the basis for a stable and US-friendly Central Asian region, 
while China does not prioritize this. Furthermore, based on the events in 
Uzbekistan in 2005, when China gave its support the to the Uzbekistani 
authoritarian leader after domestic violence, it might seem that China 
is even actively undermining these priorities. 
When it comes to energy, more competitive interests emerge. First 
of all, all energy consumers, both in the East and West, are interested in 
Russian resources. China has recently been making headway in securing 
favored access to them. The pipeline through Siberia to Daqing in China 
offers China a rich source of energy that does not pass through mari-
time routes. However this means China will offer Russia an alternative 
and thus increases its leverage against the Western markets, especially 
since the Siberian pipeline has two destinations. 
In the central Asian region, there will be similar issues over the 
direction of Kazakhstani oil. China’s energy partnership with Russia and 
Central Asia is being solidified through the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization (SCO). While the organization has a number of purposes and is 
not openly anti-US, it is widely perceived “as a Chinese tool to counter 
US presence in Central Asia and promote Beijing’s economic interests”, 
and as a way to advance its worldwide power status as a rising power. 
While the US presence is weakening, the SCO has an increasing list of 
observer nations, including such strategically important nations as Iraq, 
Iran, and Pakistan.
China’s undermining effect on Western and especially US interests 
is also noticeable in other countries, such as Venezuela, Iran, and Burma. 
In addition, China’s energy diplomacy has also had a hand in reviving 
US interest in Africa. In conclusion, competition rather than cooperation 
has been the result of China’s increasing strategic global involvement, 
and this points to a rising China that is challenging the existing power 
balance and inviting competition. Moreover, this challenge is not only 
evident through the cultivation of strategic relationships, but also in 
the military field. Despite Chinese efforts to diversify its energy routes, 
it is still highly dependent on maritime channels for transporting its 
energy supply. China’s diplomatic response to the threats it perceives 
100 from overwhelming dependence on sea lanes has brought about a sub-
stantial number of projects and policy initiatives in the countries lining 
the South Asian coast, as well as pipeline projects on the mainland. 
Ultimately, however, China still maintains that a strong navy is neces-
sary, with or without the coastal projects and diplomatic connections. 
As a result, Beijing has been active in promoting the modernization and 
development of the PLAN.
According to Chinese analysts, the greatest threat the Chinese 
perceive to the security of these sea lanes emanate from the presence 
of the US Navy in the region. The US sees itself as having the role of 
the sole protector of the free movement of goods in the region and 
around the world, as well as of a regional order conducive to the op-
eration of free markets. The position is also crucial for maintaining its 
position of economic hegemony.
Cooperation between China and the US on maritime security 
in the region is inhibited by mutual distrust. The Chinese government 
remains very suspicious of US naval activity in the region, and its in-
direct control over China’s economic lifelines. China’s leaders realize 
that the United States’ position as a guarantor of the free movement 
of energy resources can also be used for containing other powers or 
exerting political pressure. In addition to the US naval force, China is 
also increasingly watchful of India’s modernizing navy and the Japanese 
Maritime Self-Defense Force, navies of US allies in the region.
Although common security carries with it an increased capaci-
ty for defense against piracy and terrorism, China does not trust the 
forces of such major powers in possible political turmoil, and believes 
the routes can be used as political leverage against China, especially 
in the potential instance of a conflict with Taiwan. History offers China 
worrying precedents of similar US policies used in 1939 against Japan, 
or more recently in the case of an oil blockade against Iraq during the 
oil embargo 
Chinese military forays into Southeast and East Asia (the quest for 
territories in the South China Sea and East China Sea) and the growth 
and modernization of the PLAN is very worrying to the US. While the 
likelihood of a direct conflict between the US and China over energy 
security on maritime routes is slim, conflicts between US allies in the 
region and China are a possibility in the long term in the South China 
Sea, especially if any significant offshore energy resources are found. 
Recently, China’s activity around the South China Sea issue has taken 
101on a more decisive character, and the principle introduced in the 1990s, 
to “set aside differences [and] jointly develop” seems to be sinking 
as China’s energy needs surface. In 2007, China unilaterally expanded 
administrative control over two islets in the South China Sea, claiming 
“indisputable sovereignty”. In May 2009, China was accused of harassing 
a US ship in the South China Sea, while China claimed it was intruding 
in its Exclusive Economic Zone and conducting hostile activities, and 
thereby caused further friction in Sino-US maritime affairs. However, 
the greatest potential for a conflict lies with the Taiwan issue, which 
is considered the main reason for China’s worries over a blockade of 
its oil tankers.
The increasing Chinese naval presence thus creates a much more 
explosive situation on regional waterways. Rivalries between China and 
India and the rise of the Chinese naval presence on the Indian Ocean’s 
strategic sea lanes and disputed territories can cause additional problems 
for the US and will seriously challenge its role as the global defender 
of free trade and stability in the region. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the impact of strategic energy 
security issues on China’s foreign policy have increased China’s global 
influence and have thereby reduced Western presence as well as stra-
tegic influence. This also applies to US dominance of strategic sea lanes 
in the Indian Ocean, where the growth of China’s navy challenges the 
role of the US as the protector of maritime trade routes. All of this is 
not to say that there could not be cooperation over issues of maritime 
or energy security. It is clear, however, that China prefers to act alone 
to secure its strategic interests and still demonstrates a clear distrust of 
Western involvement indicated by signs of a soft balancing against the 
West when securing its strategic interests. This policy foresees limited, 
tacit, and indirect bargaining strategies through coalition building and 
diplomatic bargaining within regional or international institutions. The 
strategy is also characterized by the use of largely non-military tools 
to delay, challenge, undermine or raise the costs of US policies. Energy 
security foreign policy reveals China’s campaign of increasing regional 
presence and institutionalization without the participation of the US, 
which while not directly presenting a challenge, is not conducive to 
cooperation between the US and China. It is rather indicative of Chi-
na’s viewpoint that a multilateral international order is the ideal, and 
it reveals China’s quest to decentralize international relations in order 
to reduce the power of the US.
102 Strategic issues of power balancing are not the only ones that 
come in to play when talking about China’s rise and the West. As a 
result, the impact of energy security on China’s foreign policy, resulting 
from its growing dependence on foreign energy, has left the Chinese 
government facing issues that require a wider commitment to world 
affairs and international security. China has consequently been confronted 
with the question of whether it should manage such threats through 
existing institutions and by following existing international norms and 
values or anticipate future competition over resources and therefore 
prioritize its interests over wider global concerns and develop its close 
strategic channels of cooperation with energy exporters, striving to 
independently achieve protection against perceived threats. 
